It may seem surprising to some that a negligence case brought to recover damages turns entirely on conduct. For some, this may feel a bit incomplete. Genuine culpability, it would seem, would require at least some degree of ill motive or improper design. If the person’s intentions are entirely benevolent but their conduct inadvertently causes harm nonetheless, shouldn’t that person be absolved from liability? The law says no—good intentions are irrelevant—and for good reason.
Motive is irrelevant. From the point of view of the person who sustains an injury, the precise motive that produced the harm is irrelevant. The important point is that the harm occurred. Motive is irrelevant since the degree of purposefulness behind the conduct doesn’t change anything—the end result remains the same. From the injured person’s point of view, all that matters is the harm sustained—not the precise thought process of those who brought it about.
Motive cannot excuse what’s already occurred. In addition, benign motives are almost always used as a post hoc justification. But such good intentions cannot excuse harmful outcomes. In fact, good intentions are often based on ill-logic, improper planning, or poor foresight—all of which can produce harmful results. Once harm has occurred, society’s interest in seeing that harm redressed takes precedence over a particular individual’s professed motives in having acting in a certain manner.
Motive cannot be easily ascertained. Determining motive is imprecise and uncertain, even in the presence of witnesses, whereas determining conduct can be more accurately shown based on testimony. Better to focus on that which can be more accurately ascertained rather than to base decisions on indeterminate soundings of what someone might have been thinking at a particular moment. For this reason civil law typically presumes a benign though inattentive outlook—true malice-based intentionality remains the province of other areas.
“It is crucial to apprehend at the outset that negligence is not as might have been thought a state of mind, but conduct—whether it consist in action or omission to act. The law is not concerned with matters of conscience.” J. Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts, pg. 22, (Oxford University Press 1985).
Conduct in fact explains more than motive. And motive can often be inferred from conduct. The word “negligence” derives from the Latin neclegentia, implying one who behaves in a manner that’s heedless, careless, or unconcerned. And one who is heedless is simply unmindful of the consequences. That’s typically enough to explain most accidents—the facts alone usually allow such unmindfulness to be traced quickly and directly back to its origin.
